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A MODEL FOR TEAM MANAGERS IN THE PRESENCE 










We develop a model of team formation in which workers learn about their level 
of ability. We show that insuﬃcient cooperation may arise as workers learn positively 
about their own skills. We then build a model for team managers and establish that their 
objectivity in assessing coworkers’ abilities may facilitate cooperation among agents. This 
is the case because managers are able to design team contracts based on workers’ true 
performances. Our work provides a motive for the existence of team managers in the 
absence of asymmetry of information. 
 
 1 Introduction
Teamwork has become increasingly popular in organizations since the begin-
ning of the nineties (Dumaine 1990, Osterman 1994, Lawler, Morhman and
Ledford 1995, Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 1997) so that understanding
the factors leading to team success has become decisive (Stewart 2006). In
this paper, we provide a psychological approach to the issue of team formation
and team management. In particular, we develop a model in which individu-
als suﬀer from self-serving biases. Self-serving biases imply that workers tend
to learn positively about their own skills. There exists widespread evidence
in the Psychology literature stressing that people learn optimistically about
themselves by taking credit for successes while denying responsibility for fail-
ures (Bradley 1978, Miller and Ross 1975, Zuckerman 1979). Individuals are
inclined to process information distortedly so as to build a positive self-image
(Fiske and Taylor 1991, Nisbett and Ross 1980). In addition, there is extensive
evidence that people recall their successes better than their failures (Korner
1950, Silverman 1964, Mischel, Ebbesen and Zeiss 1976). This leads individ-
uals to hold excessively positive beliefs about themselves (Greenwald 1980,
Svenson 1981 and Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg 1988). Psychology literature
has mostly interpreted biases in inference and attribution as motivational bi-
ases. Agents are considered to feel better-oﬀ when learning positively about
themselves. We account for these motivational biases by assuming that work-
ers are likely to process bad signals about their abilities as if they were good
signals.
Various researchers have studied the role of behavioral factors in the con-
text of teams. They have focused on ﬁnding possible solutions to free riding
arising in teams when eﬀorts of its members are not observable.1 Rotemberg
(1994) demonstrates how altruism can improve workers’ cooperation and wel-
fare when complementarities exist among team members. Kandel and Lazear
(1992) show how peer pressure can increase cooperation among workers by
stressing how workers can reduce the negative eﬀects of peer pressure by ex-
erting higher levels of eﬀorts. Gervais and Goldstein (2006) ﬁnd that workers’
biased self-perception facilitates cooperation among agents. The argument is
that an overconﬁdent agent overestimates his marginal product of eﬀort lead-
ing himself and his coworker to exert more eﬀort in the team. The authors
show that both the self-conﬁdent and the rational workers can beneﬁtf r o m
overconﬁdence.
To analyze team formation we consider a two-period model in which work-
ers jointly decide whether to form a team or work alone. We assume that
workers’ abilities are unknown, and agents update their beliefs about abilities
after receiving a signal at the end of the ﬁrst period. We show that when
workers suﬀer from self-serving attribution, cooperation among agents is un-
dermined. The negative impact of self-serving biases on team formation is
1Free riding issues in teams have been studied in numerous papers such as Holmstrom
(1982), Itoh (1991)o rC h ea n dY o o( 2 0 0 1).
5referred to as the teams inefficiency result.
We then consider how hiring a team manager can improve cooperation
among self-serving workers. This helps us shed light on the debate on the
eﬃciency of organizations implementing self-managed teams (Dumaine 1990,
Goodman, Devadas and Hughson 1998, Stewart and Barrick 2000). We show
that in equilibrium team managers that are capable of observing workers’
performances objectively can help improve cooperation among agents. This
is the case because team managers are able to design team contracts based
on true workers’ performances. Managers will permit workers to learn more
objectively about their own abilities. In our model, managers are able to learn
correctly about workers’ performances since they are not involved in choosing
the production process. If managers are involved in the production process
they may tend to blame workers for insuﬃcient performances rather than
challenging the production system that they decided to implement (Repenning
and Sterman 2002).
We also show that managers are hired even if observing workers perfor-
mances is costly. We provide in this paper a psychological motivation for the
existence of managers. Asymmetries of information are not necessary in our
model to show that team managers can be hired in equilibrium. The manager
considered in this paper is not a teamwork supervisor as it is described in
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Holmstrom (1982). These authors empha-
size that in the presence of moral hazard in teams, a supervisor that holds
a residual claim on the team outcome can lead workers to exert their opti-
mal level of eﬀort. In our framework, workers’ performances are mutually
observable. However, individuals may interpret diﬀerently the same pieces of
information as long as they suﬀer from self-serving biases. This is the case
because workers tend to learn excessively positively about their own level
of ability. Our approach implies that the manager has an informational rent
since he is able to observe workers’ performances objectively. In our model, the
manager has private information about individuals’ abilities whereas workers
do not correctly asses their own performances.
Our framework diﬀers from the ones previously mentioned since it elimi-
nates free riding issues by assuming observability of coworkers’ actions. We
consider the most favorable case for workers’ cooperation by focusing on teams
with a suﬃciently close level of collaboration such that agents are able to ob-
serve each others’ performances and actions. Asymmetry of information arises
as a consequence of self-serving biases. This is the case since learning biases
imply that workers learn diﬀerently about their ability and the ability of their
partner.
This paper is structured as follows. In the second section, we present the
model of team formation and we establish the teams inefficiency result.I n
Section 3, we develop a model for managers. We discuss our results in Section
4 by emphasizing the empirical implications of our model.
62 Team formation and self-serving biases
2.1 The team formation framework
We consider the case of two workers deciding whether to complete an individ-
ual or a team project. Examples of such decisions are found in the academia
when researchers decide whether to write a single-authored or a coauthored
paper. Workers may also be confronted with decisions to form teams in their
organizations as in the case of the Koret Corporation described by Hamil-
ton, Nickerson and Owan (2003). We propose to model team formation in
a two-period game described as follows. At t =0 , the two coworkers decide
simultaneously whether to undertake the individual or the group project. The
team project is undertaken only if both workers agree to do so. At the end of
the ﬁrst period the outcome of the project chosen at t =0is observed by both
workers. At t =1 , agents decide whether to continue with the project under-
t a k e ni nt h eﬁrst period. The outcome associated to the project performed
i nt h es e c o n dp e r i o di so b s e r v e da tt =2 . Team members do not know nei-
ther their own ability to undertake the task nor the ability of their coworker.
Workers update their beliefs about abilities at the end of the ﬁrst period after
observing the outcome of the project chosen in the ﬁrst period. We assume
agents are risk neutral so that they select their projects by maximizing ex-
pected payoﬀs. An agent i ∈ {1;2} when working alone undertakes a project
that is a success [failure] with probability qi [1 − qi] and delivers a payoﬀ
Xi,t ≡ G (B<G ), where qi is deﬁned as Worker i’s ability. The subscript
t corresponds to time where t ∈ {0;1;2}. We drop the time subscript when
not necessary. We assume a Beta prior distribution for individual abilities:
qi ∼ Beta(α,β) and we denote q∗ = α
α+β the mean of this distribution.2-3 The
outcomes of the two individual projects are assumed to be independent. If
workers choose to form a team, they are involved in a project that delivers the
following payoﬀ γ (X1,t + X2,t), ∀t ∈ {1;2}. The total outcome of the group
project is shared according to an allocation rule η ∈ [0,1] so that Workers
1 and 2 get respectively payoﬀs ηγ(X1,t + X2,t) and (1 − η)γ (X1,t + X2,t).
The parameter γ represents synergies obtained for working in a team. We
assume γ is known by workers at t =0 . The absence of synergies corresponds
to γ =1 . In that case the total outcome of the team project is the sum of
the individual projects outcomes. In addition, we assume the existence of a
learning by doing eﬀect such that if workers repeat a project (a team or an
individual project) the expected payoﬀs associated to that project are mul-
tiplied by φ ≥ 1. We consider no discount factors; the eﬀect of discounting
would be to reduce the role of learning about workers’ abilities at t =1 .4 We
2The beta prior assumption is convenient since the beta distribution is a conjugate
prior for the binomial problem considered here (Box and Tiao 1973). In addition, beta
distributions can approximate any reasonably smooth unimodal distribution on [0,1] (Lee
1997).
3Similar results are obtained if we consider workers with diﬀerent prior abilities.
4A low discount factor would not be consistent with our aim since we want to consider
projects for which learning and then self-attribution biases matter.
7discuss the assumptions of our model of team formation as well as possible
extensions in Appendix A.
2.2 The benchmark case: the absence of self-serving biases
We consider an allocation rule under which the share of the group outcome
obtained by an individual is equal to his relative ability. The relative ability of
Worker i is deﬁned as
ˆ qi,t
ˆ qi,t+ˆ qj,t,i6= j,∀(i,j) ∈ {1;2},∀t ∈ {0;1}. We denote
ˆ qi,t the level of ability of Worker i as updated by a Bayesian inferer given
information up to time t. Under this allocation rule, Worker i’s expected
payoﬀs for a team project undertaken for the ﬁrst time is γˆ qi,t.T h e n e x t
proposition shows that, in this case, workers form teams at t =0whenever
γ ≥ 1.5 This result still holds if coworkers’ prior abilities are diﬀerent as long
as both workers agree on the priors.
Proposition 1 Under the relative ability allocation rule and in the absence
of self-serving biases, teams are formed at t =0whenever γ ≥ 1.
Our proposition shows that by selecting a splitting rule that depends on
updated workers’ ability, the maximum level of workers’ cooperation is at-
tained.6 As a result, we show that the eﬃcient teams outcome (ETO) is
attainable in the absence of self-serving biases, where the ETO corresponds
to the payoﬀs obtained by team members when teams are formed at t =0
and continued at t =1whenever γ ≥ 1.W ec a l le ﬃcient teams equilibrium
(ETE) an equilibrium that implements the ETO. A team is called eﬃcient
whenever γ ≥ 1.
2.3 The teams ineﬃciency result
In this section we consider that workers suﬀer from biases in their learning
process. Self-serving attribution as it is mentioned in the introduction can be
seen as Bayesian learning with imperfect processing of negative signals. Re-
searchers have found that positive personality information is eﬃciently pro-
cessed whereas negative personality information is poorly processed (Kuiper
and Derry 1982, Kuiper and McDonald 1982, Kuiper et al. 1985). We intro-
duce inference biases by assuming that, with probability p, workers process
bad signals about their ability as if they were good signals. Our assumption
implies a diﬀerent treatment of bad and good signals. This asymmetry in the
learning process is what we call biased self-attribution or self-serving learning.
5In addition to the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium considered in Proposition 1,t h e
other subgame-perfect equilibria are as follows. By backward induction we obtain the
following equilibria. 1) No workers form teams at t =1and teams are formed for γ ≥ φ
at t =0 . 2) No workers form teams at t =0and at t =1 . 3) Teams are formed at t =1
and no teams are formed at t =0 . These equilibria involve weakly dominated strategies.
In addition they involve strategies that prevent any cooperation in at least one of the two
periods.
6However, one may think of real life examples in which workers are not paid with respect
to their relative abilities. In the case of Economics research, credits are shared equally among
team members.
8Workers are tempted to distort bad signals about their abilities in order to
build a positive self-image. Through time, above average eﬀects arise leading
workers to see themselves as more talented than their coworkers. The lat-
ter eﬀects generate a dispersion in coworkers’ beliefs about their own ability
and the ability of their coworker. Diﬀerences in perceptions about abilities
will lead agents to break teams. The learning process that is considered in
this section is described in Assumption 1. Workers are assumed to suﬀer
from self-serving biases by mistakenly interpreting bad signals about their
abilities.7 We consider that agents are aware of their incentives to process
information with biases.8 A tt h es a m et i m ew ea s s u m et h a tw o r k e r su p d a t e
others’ abilities using Bayesian inference. We take pG [pB] to be the expected
probability given information at t =0that Xi,1 = G [Xi,1 = B],∀i ∈ {1;2}.
Assumption 1 (Self-serving Learning for sophisticated work-
ers)
We denote σij Worker i’s perception of Worker j’s performance at t =
1,∀(i,j) ∈ {1;2}
2. We assume that, with probability p,aW o r k e ri
perceives his bad performance at t =1( Xi,1 = B) as if it was a good
performance (σii = G),∀i ∈ {1;2}.9 T h eu p d a t i n gr u l ea tt =1is
described as follows, ∀i ∈ {1;2}.


















A worker updates his coworker’s ability using Bayesian inference and
correct information processing, that is σij = Xj,1, ∀i 6= j and (i,j) ∈
{1,2}
2.
We denote Ei,S the expectation of workers suﬀering from self-serving bi-
ases p.10 We introduce a subscript i for the expectation of Worker i since when
learning biases are present coworkers’ expectations may not coincide. We as-
sume that the two coworkers suﬀer from learning biases. According to our
learning process, workers update diﬀerently beliefs about their own ability and
beliefs about others’ abilities. Agents are considered to behave as Bayesian
inferers when updating others’ abilities but they are assumed to suﬀer from
self-serving biases when updating their own ability. There is evidence in the
literature in Psychology that individuals see themselves more positively than
others see them. For example, Lewinsohn et al. (1980) compared the ratings
made by observers and by college students themselves about personality char-
acteristics like friendliness, warmth and assertiveness of students involved in
7Learning biases can be modeled as a result of errors in information processing or as
memory imperfections. However, this distinction between the diﬀerent origins of learning
biases is not central to our results and to their implications.
8Bénabou and Tirole (2002) refer to this assumption as metacognition.
9Workers’ biases are assumed to be independent.
10Alternatively, we can consider the case of two agents with diﬀerent degrees of self-serving
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Figure 1: Timeline for the team formation model with self-serving workers.
a group interaction task. They found that self-ratings were signiﬁcantly more
positive than observers’ ratings. We consider the case in which team workers
do not suﬀer from learning biases in assessing their coworker’s ability.
The self-serving learning process is assumed to be common knowledge.
We consider that workers are aware of their incentives to be biased. Work-
ers will try to overcome their biases by recovering the correct signals about
their abilities. The ineﬃciency result captured in Proposition 2 is based on
the assumption that workers are unable to recover information about their
own ability. This behavior is consistent with Assumptions 2a and 2b.I n
this section, we assess the robustness of the teams inefficiency result by
considering sophisticated agents of the type described in Bénabou and Tirole
(2002).
We deﬁne a contract as the share of the group outcome ηi distributed to
Worker i at t =1 ,∀i ∈ {1;2}.11 The set of contracts analyzed are budget
balanced, that is the group outcome is distributed in its totality to workers
(η1 + η2 =1 ) . We consider contracts that can be contingent on coworkers’
performances received at t =1 . The diﬃculty is that workers’ suﬀering from
self-serving biases may disagree about the signals received at t =1 . To tackle
this issue we consider that contracts are contingent on the signals revealed
b yt h ea g e n t sr a t h e rt h a no nt h es i g n a l se ﬀectively observed. We modify the
initial framework by introducing a revelation game at t =1after workers
have observed their performances on the ﬁrst period project (Figure 2).12
Workers are interested in communicating about their perceived abilities since
they know that their coworker is an objective observer of their performances.
On aggregate workers have complete information about abilities since Worker
1[ 2 ]knows Worker 2[ 1 ]ability level at t =1 .
The structure of the revelation game played at t =1is as follows.
At t =1each coworker chooses an action ai ≡ (ai1,a i2) ∀i ∈ {1,2}, where
ai is a vector of messages that belongs to the set S of possible signals observed
11The share of the group outcome given to Worker 1 in the ﬁrst period is not considered
further since η1 =
1
2 ensures team formation at t =0if team formation is obtained at t =1 .
12We assume that performances are not veriﬁable by the court. If performances were
veriﬁable by the court, workers could reach the ETO by asking the court to reveal workers’
performances. Evidently, such a process can be costly to workers.
10at t =0 ’.T h es e tS is actually the set of possible types of coworkers. This is
the case since the perception of performances by the agents constitutes their
private information.13
At t =1 ’ where 1’ ∈ ]1,2[, workers decide either to continue with the
project selected at t =0or to undertake the other project. We denote bi ∈
B ≡ {T;NT},W o r k e ri’s action at t =1 ’, ∀i ∈ {1;2}, where T [NT] stands
for forming a team [working alone].
The actions of the two agents will determine the share of the group out-
come given to the ﬁrst coworker (η) as a function of the revealed signals, that
is η ≡ η1 (a11,a 12,a 21,a 22).14 We denote Vi (ai,a j,b i,b j) the expected payoﬀs
obtained by Worker i when undertaking the second period project, ∀i 6= j
and (i,j) ∈ {1;2}
2.
Given that workers assess each others’ abilities as Bayesian inferers, we
may wonder if allowing workers to communicate will lead agents to elimi-
nate their learning biases and cooperate eﬃciently.15 The result captured
in Proposition 2 shows that such conjecture is not veriﬁed, an ETE being
impossible to achieve.
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We denote 1T [1NT] the indicator function that takes value one for b1 =
b2 = T [(b1,b 2)6=(T,T)].
A PBE is deﬁned for a given contract function η : x 7→ η(x), where
x ∈ {B;G}
4 and η(x) ∈ [0,1].
Proposition 2 There exist no Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) that im-
plement the ETO.
Workers are unable to reach the ETO b e c a u s et h e yh a v ea ni n c e n t i v e
to reveal themselves as being high-ability workers in order to obtain a higher
share of the group outcome. These incentives to lie implies that truthful telling
is costly to achieve. Indeed, workers tell the truth in equilibrium only if the
allocation rule of the group outcome is a ﬁxed rule that is not contingent on
(a1,a 2),i . e .η(a1,a 2)=¯ η.H o w e v e r ,ﬁxed allocation rules do not provide the
adequate incentives for workers to form teams since then high-performance
13The set of possible messages being the set of types, we can use the Revelation Principle
and conclude that our results continue to hold for any message space. The Revelation
Principle can be applied to our model since it can be represented as a normal form game of
a static Bayesian game.
14We denote ηi (a11,a 12,a 21,a 22) the share of the group outcome obtained by Worker i.
15This would be the case when teams are formed whenever γ ≥ 1.
11t=0 t=1 t=1’ t=2
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Figure 2: Timeline for the manager’s game when a manager is hired at t =0 .
w o r k e r sw i l lp e r c e i v et h e i rt e a mr e w a r d sa sb e i n gi n s u ﬃcient. In the case
of ﬁxed allocation rules the ETO is not attainable even in the presence of
complete information.16
3 Team managers
3.1 A model for team managers
We consider a situation in which a third agent called a manager has the
possibility to observe workers’ performances. The manager is assumed to
update workers’ abilities without biases. This assumption is in agreement
with the motivational explanation underlying biased self-attribution that is
discussed in the introduction.17
Deﬁnition 2 A manager is an agent that is able to observe team workers’
performances without biases.
The manager is assumed to observe workers’ performances without costs.
The manager is paid a proportion (ξ>0) of the total payoﬀso fc o w o r k e r s ’
projects in the second period. The timing of the game is described as follows
and represented in Figure 3.
At t =0 , workers decide simultaneously whether to be involved in an in-
dividual or a team project rewarded according to equal splitting. They decide
as well whether to hire a manager or not. If workers decide to hire a manager
and the manager accepts the oﬀer, the game continues as described below. At
t =1 , workers receive the payoﬀso ft h eﬁrst period project and the manager
decides the allocation rule for the team project undertaken in the second pe-
riod. This is equivalent to say that the manager has the full bargaining power.
At t =1 ’ > 1, workers decide whether to continue with the ﬁrst period project
or undertake another project. If workers decide not to hire a manager, the
game becomes the one presented in Section 3. It is straightforward to see that
16The proof of this result is trivial and is available upon request.
17Agents are considered to feel better-oﬀ when learning positively about themselves. In
the model considered in this section, the manager does not learn about himself since he is
not involved in team production.
12if no bribery is possible, an ETE is attainable in this game.18 In the absence
of bribery, the following strategies deﬁne a truthful telling PBE: a manager
is hired, the manager pays workers based on their true relative ability (that
is the relative ability as perceived by the manager) and workers form teams
whenever γ ≥ 1. A truthful telling equilibrium (TTE) is such that all the
information is revealed in equilibrium.19 This occurs if workers truthfully
reveal their perceived performances (ai = σi ≡ (σii,σij),i6= j).I nt h a tc a s e ,
workers are able to recover the true information about their performances and
this implies that learning biases are fully recognized. This PBEh o l d sa sl o n g
as the manager has an interest to participate, that is ξ>ˆ ξ.20 We provide in
the next proposition a rationale for the existence of managers by establish-
ing the conditions for the existence of the truthful telling PBE previously
mentioned. Managers prevent team conﬂicts by designing contracts based
on informed and objective beliefs about workers’ abilities. Managers possess
an informational rent that is the result of their ability to provide unbiased
assessments about workers’ abilities. The main diﬀerence with the situation
considered in Section 2 is that one of the agent (the manager) involved in
the team has complete information at t =1 .W o r k e r s 1 and 2 only observe
correctly their coworker’s performance whereas the manager observes team
members’ performances accurately.
As long as ξ can be taken suﬃciently close to 0, the presence of a manager
is optimal for any of the situations in which an ETE is not achievable. That is,


















,am a n a g e ri sh i r e dw i t ha
strictly positive maximum rent increasing in the level of synergies (γ) and in










an ETE can be reached by using a sim-
ple equal sharing rule (η = 1
2)s ot h a tm a n a g e r sw i l ln o tb eh i r e di nt h a t
18Bribery is possible if a worker is able to pay the manager in order to change his release
of the worker’s ability.
19In a context in which bribery is possible, the conditions for the implementation of the
ETO a r em o r ed i ﬃcult to meet. If it was not the case, managers could reject the bribery
oﬀer. Bribery increases the cost of hiring a manager whereas the beneﬁts of his presence are
at most the same. The gains of engaging a manager are maximum when the ETO can be
implemented due to the presence of a manager. This happens when no bribery is possible
but may not happen when opportunities for bribery exist. As a result, if γ or p are not









20We denote ˆ ξ2γφq
∗ the revenue associated to the manager’s outside option, where 2γφq
∗
is the expected aggregate outcome for the second period when workers decide to continue
with the team project.case. We derive in Appendix B the contracts that lead to the highest work-









. These contracts are
respectively the rigid allocation rule (e.g. η = 1
2) in the absence of a reve-









TTE) if the revelation
game is implemented.21 In the absence of a communication game, workers



























TTE) are available, the maximum rents for
the manager are respectively:
(3) 2[1 − χ1 (γ,φ,p)]γφq∗ where: χ1 (γ,φ,p)=χ(γ,φ,0)
(4) 2[1 − χ2 (γ,φ,p)]γφq∗
(5) 2[1 − χ3 (γ,φ,p)]γφq∗ where:






























It is easy to see that these maximum rents are increasing in both γ and p.
Proposition 3 stresses how the objectivity of managers can be rewarded in
equilibrium. The manager is hired if the level of synergies is not too high, that






qB+ˆ qG), but his rent is increasing in γ in this interval.
The rent of managers is increasing in the synergy parameter since the presence
of managers allows more teams to be formed. The more team formation is
valued, the more team managers earn in equilibrium. Another reasonable
result is that managers’ pay increases as coworkers’ cognitive biases increase.
This is the case because managers’ earnings depend on their informational
advantage compared to coworkers. The more frequently workers overestimate
their ability the more often team managers have an informational rent. As a
result, the manager’s informational rent and then his pay are increasing in p.
In our model, there exists an incentive for team managers to maintain workers’
biased self-attribution at a high level in order to maximize their informational
rent. This behavior of managers is a limitation to the process of debiasing
coworkers that adds to the individual’s psychological cost of overcoming one’s
own biases.
3.2 Team management when observing coworkers’ performances
is costly
Proposition 3 is based on the fact that a team manager can costlessly observe
coworkers’ performances. We can extend our initial model by considering the
case in which managers observe workers’ performances at a cost c>0.I nt h a t
case, at t =1managers will decide whehter to observe workers’ performances
or not.
21The deﬁnition of the diﬀerent contracts are provided in Appendix B. Team contracts
are analyzed in details in Corgnet (2006a).
11Assumption 2 (Costs of observing coworkers’ performances)
We assume that either the manager observes the performances of
both workers at t =1or he does not observe any performances.
We consider that observing coworkers’ performances is performed
at a cost c>0.
Assumption 3 (Structure of synergies)
We consider the possibility for the formation of ineﬃcicent teams.
In particular, we assume that forming a team of bad performances
workers at t =1(X1,1 = X2,1 = B)i si n e ﬃcient. That is, if
workers choose to form a team when X1,1 = X2,1 = B, they will
receive the payoﬀ v(X1,1 + X2,1), where v<1 with probability ω
and they will receive the payoﬀ γ (X1,1 + X2,1) with probability
(1 − ω).
As long as the gains in terms of increased cooperation are suﬃciently
high, even managers suﬀering costs of gathering information may be hired in
equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Even if a manager observes workers’ performances at a cost
c>0, he will be hired in equilibrium as long as c ≤ 2ω(γ − v)pBBqB.
In Proposition 4, we show that managers are hired in equilibrium as long
as the cost of observing workers’ performances is not too high compared to
the beneﬁts of observing performances. The beneﬁts associated to observing
workers’ performances depend on the likelihood of ineﬃcient team formation
(ωpBB) and on the maginitude of the ineﬃciency of teams formed by bad per-
formances workers (2(γ − v)qB). Managers do not have incentives to observe
workers’ performances in equilibrium when c>0 if teams are always eﬃcient
(γ = v). In that case team workers will anticipate that the manager will not
observe workers’ performances and they will decide not to hire a manager at
t =0 . To the contrary, if c ≤ 2ω(γ − v)pBBqB then team workers know that
managers will observe performances in equilibrium. In that case, workers
know that hiring a manager at t =0will make possible the formation of any
eﬃcient team if the manager decides at t =1to reward workers according to
their true relative performances.22 As a result, hiring a manager is going to
increase workers’ expected payoﬀs with respect to any of the contracts con-
sidered in Appendix B. This is the case since there exist no contracts that




In this paper we developed a model of team formation in which workers are
learning about their ability on a speciﬁc task. Backed by extensive psycholog-
ical evidence, we considered the case in which workers are learning positively
22An ineﬃcient team occurs with probability ω when workers performing badly in the
ﬁrst period decide to work together. Any other team is eﬃcient.
12about themselves. In that context eﬃcient teams are not always formed.
This is the case because self-serving workers process information diﬀerently
a n dh o l dd i ﬀerent beliefs about workers’ abilities. As a result, workers have
private information about the ability of their coworkers. However, workers
are not willing to inform their talented coworkers since then they would re-
ceive a lower share of the team outcome. We then explored the possibility
of hiring a team manager in order to reduce the ineﬃciency in teams. We
assumed that managers had the ability to observe workers’ performances ob-
jectively.23 Team managers were then able to design team contracts based on
true workers’ abilities. This implied the existence of an equilibrium in which
workers learn correctly about themselves and always form eﬃcient teams. We
also showed that managers would be hired in equilibrium even if observing
workers’ performances is costly.
As a result, we expect self-managed teams to be more commonly observed
in contexts in which workers have low degrees of self-serving biases. In par-
ticular, cultural diﬀerences in the way people learn about themselves have
been documented by psychologists. Japanese appear to be more self-critical
than US and Canadian citizens (Kitayama et al. 1997, Heine et al. 1999,
Heine, Kitayama, and Lehman 2001). In agreement with our model is the
observation that the Japanese society characterized by self-criticism rather
than self-serving attribution is associated with a corporate culture based on
the intensive use of self-managed teams (Haitani 1990, Koike 1988).
In general, we expect autonomy in teams to be more detrimental as work-
ers are learning intensively about their abilities. We expect self-managed
teams to perform better when the team task leads to unambiguous feeback.
Indeed, there exists evidence that individidulas’ self-serving biases are stronger
as the outcome of the task is more diﬃcult to assess (Farh and Dobbins 1989,
Huber 1991, Audia and Brion 2006). This is the case because individuals can
more easily distort ambiguous information. We then predict that autonomy
in teams will lead to higher performances in the case of teams involved in rou-
tine tasks associated with little learning and unequivocal feedback compared
to creative team tasks involving extensive learning and ambiguous feeback.
This implication of our model is in opposition to the analysis developed in
the literature on self-managed teams that stresses how autonomy in teams
should be more beneﬁcial for creative and conceptual tasks than for routine
tasks (Manz and Stewart 1997, Stewart and Barrick 2000). These authors
argue that autonomy facilitates communication, ﬂexibility, and conﬂict reso-
lution so that creative and knowledge tasks that are more demanding in these
dimensions are expected to beneﬁt more extensively from self-leadership than
routine tasks. However, the meta-analytic review undertaken by Stewart
(2006) supports the reverse empirical implication as it is expected under our
current framework. Then, we can regard workers’ self-serving biases as a
psychological limitation to increased autonomy in teams.
23There exists evidence that objectivity evaluations of subordinates is particularly relevant
in identifying outstanding managers (Tan and Jamal 2001).
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Appendix A
Comments on the assumptions. Instead of assuming perfect observability
of coworkers’ performances, it may appear more natural to consider that workers
learn more about their partner when they work as a team. We can study the case in
which workers are able to observe others’ performances only when they form a team.
This leads to a framework in which workers may decide to hide bad news about their
abilities in order to signal themselves as being high-ability coworkers. In this setting
the teams inefficiency result remains valid for any of the equilibria of the game.
This is the case since the conditions for team formation at t =0crucially depend
on the conditions for team formation at t =1when a team has been formed at
t =0 . Since these conditions do not change with respect to the benchmark model,
the conditions for team formation at t =0are not modiﬁed. The analysis of this
game is available in an extended version of this paper that is available upon request.
Concerning the risk neutrality assumption, we have to mention that taking into
account risk aversion is likely to strengthen our results. The idea is that, as self-
serving biases increase, the uncertainty about team continuation at t =1rises. As
a result, the negative impact of self-serving attribution on workers’ cooperation is
likely to be higher for risk averse agents.
Instead of assuming the presence of a learning by doing eﬀect (φ), we can consider
a ﬁxed cost C>0 incurred for shifting from the individual [team] project to the team
[individual] project at t =1 . The analysis of this game is available in an extended
version of this paper that is available upon request. We show that the main results
of our paper are not modiﬁed. The analysis of this game is available in an extended
version of this paper that is available upon request.
We consider in our model a situation in which workers have the possibility to
leave the team at t =1 . However, there exist cases in which agents may attempt
to commit at t =0to continue with the project started in the ﬁrst period. We
have to stress that commitment at t =0may be broken at t =1by one of the two
workers. In our framework commitment is not credible as it happens in many real
life situations in which an exante agreement can be broken without further costs.
Appendix B
In the next proposition we derive, assuming a team has been formed at t =0 ,
the contracts that are most likely to lead to team formation when γφ <
2ˆ qG
qB+ˆ qG.
These contracts are deﬁn e db e l o wa n dc o m p a r e di nP r o p o s i t i o n5. Similar contracts
can be deﬁned if a team has not been formed at t =0by substituting φ by 1
φ in






TTE).F o rγφ <
2ˆ qG
qB+ˆ qG we know that
contracts based on ﬁxed allocation rules cannot ensure team formation whenever
γ ≥ 1. We then consider contingent contracts and analyze the truthful telling PBE
















η(i,j,k,l)=¯ η,∀(i,j,k,l) ∈ S2
C1
TTE,¯ η is the contract associated to the TTE derived in Proposition 4.I t i s
such that allocation rules are independent of the signals revealed by workers at t =1 .
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is such that allocation rules depend on the signals revealed
by coworkers at t =1 . In particular, considering γφ <
2ˆ qG
qB+ˆ qG, the share of the










for (X1,1,X 2,1)=( G,B)[ ( B,G)].T h i s
contingent contract associated with full revelation of information in equilibrium al-
lows workers to be rewarded based on their true relative ability. However, this con-
tract does not permit teams to be formed when both workers receive a bad signal
a n da tl e a s to n eo ft h e ms u ﬀers from self-serving biases. This is the case since truth-










teams are formed for both σ ≡ (σ1,σ2) ∈ Σ and (X1,1,X 2,1) ∈ V .W e d e n o t e
Σ ≡ {(G,B,B,G);(G,B,B,B);(B,B,B,G)} and V ≡ {(G,B);(B,G)}.I n
order to ensure team formation for (X1,1,X 2,1) ∈ V ,w eh a v et op r e v e n tt e a mf o r -
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ηGBGG = ηGBBB = ηGBGB, ηGGBG = ηBBBG = ηBGBG
























, on the signals revealed





















c a nb ei m p r o v e db yt a k i n gηBBBG = ηBGBG and ηGBBB =
ηGBGB s i n c et h e nt e a m sc a nb ef o r m e df o rb o t hσ ∈ {(G,B,B,B);(B,B,B,G)}






team formation for any γφ ≥
qB+3qG
2(qB+qG) since teams are not formed when both work-
ers receive a bad signal and both workers exhibit self-serving learning. The three
15contracts previously deﬁned do not strictly dominate each other, choosing the best
contract depends on the level of synergies and on the level of learning biases. This
result is stated in Proposition 5, where the Best contract is deﬁned as the contract
implementing the highest coworkers’ expected aggregate welfare in equilibrium.























) is the Best contract.
ii) For γφ <
qB+3qG
2(qB+qG) and pG ≥ (2p−p2)pB
2 , (C2
TTE) is the Best contract.
iii) For γφ ≥
qB+3qG
2(qB+qG) and pG ≥
p2pB
2 , (C3
TTE) is the Best contract.




leads to individual work when the signals received are asymmetric whereas team
formation is obtained in that case for the two other contracts. The three contracts
are not equivalent since contracts (C2
TTE) and (C3
TTE) are preferred when self-
serving biases are not too high, that is respectively when p(2 − p) ≤
2pG
pB and p ≤
q
2pG
pB .A ni n c r e a s ei nc o w o r k e r s ’l e a r n i n gb i a s e s(p) does not aﬀect the probability




decreases the frequency with which teams are formed under contracts (C2
TTE) and
(C3
TTE). In the next corollary, we derive from Propositions 4 and 5 the conditions
under which contracts stating ﬁxed allocation rules are dominated by contracts based
on allocation rules that are contingent on coworkers’ revealed signals.
Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 1. The proposition follows from the conditions for team
formation at t =1under the relative ability allocation rule. By comparing expected
payoﬀs associated to team projects and individual projects, it is easy to see that
teams are formed at t =1after a team has [not] been formed at t =0if γ ≥ φ [1
φ].
As a result, at t =0 , teams are formed whenever γ ≥ 1.T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt os a y
that the ETO is achieved.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2. We denote σ1 ≡ (σ11,σ12) and σ2 ≡ (σ21,σ22),
and we take pG [pB] to be the expected probability given information at t =0that
Xi,1 = G [Xi,1 = B],∀i ∈ {1;2}.
i) First, we show that an ETE is only possible if it is a truthful telling equi-
librium (TTE). A truthful telling PBE is such that in equilibrium workers re-












(B,B) and both agents suﬀer from self-serving learning (i.e. σ1 =( G,B) and






. We argue that these conditions for team formation can be obtained
only if workers’ beliefs converge in the revelation game. As long as agents’ beliefs
diverge, Proposition 2 shows that an ETE is no attainable. The only way beliefs




=( B,B); σ1 =( G,B);
σ2 =( B,G)) is when both workers tell the truth. In that case, both workers learn
that they performed poorly in the ﬁrst period. As a result, an ETE has to be
truthful telling.
ii) Second, we prove that a truthful telling PBE cannot implement the ETO.
This is the case since eﬃcient teams (γ ≥ 1) may not be formed when a team has









.ATTE must be such
that workers cannot be worse-oﬀ by playing ai 6= σi whether a team has been formed
at t =0or not. These conditions generate a system of 8 inequations that lead to
the following unique solution η(ijkl) =¯ η,∀(i,j,k,l) ∈ S2. The lower bound for









and corresponds to the
case ¯ η = 1
2.S i n c e
2qG
qB+qG > 1,w eg e tt h ei n e ﬃciency result stated in Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3. The ﬁrst part of the proposition follows from simple
algebra comparing the expected utility of a worker in the diﬀerent cases. We consider
t h ec a s eo fs y m m e t r i cc o n t r a c t s( e a c hw o r k e rp a y st h es a m ea m o u n tt ot h em a n a g e r )
so that the expected utility of the two coworkers is the same. This is the most
favorable situation for the manager since it is the case in which the expected payoﬀs
for the coworker with the lowest expected welfare are maximum. Under symmetric
contracts the necessary conditions for hiring a manager are less demanding than for
any other contracts.
The second part of the proposition is proved in the main text
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4. A manager will be hired in equilibrium if he decides
to observe workers’ performances at a cost c>0. A manager will observe workers’
performances in equilibrium if and only if:
ξ (2γq∗ω − c) ≥ ξ (2pGBγ (qB + qG)+2 pGGγqG +2 pBBvqB)ω
⇔ c ≤ 2ω(γ − v)pBBqB.
Under this condition, the manager does not have incentives to deviate since not
observing workers’ performances leads to a lower expected payoﬀ.A s a r e s u l t , i f
c ≤ 2ω(γ − v)pBBqB a manager is hired in equilibrium and this manager decides
to observe workers’ performances at a cost c>0.
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